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COMMENTS
DUE PROCESS AND THE ADOPTIVE PARENT
The trend in California adoption law has been toward a fuller
recognition of the rights of adoptive parents.' When a child is
placed for adoption2 by an adoption agency, the prospective par-
ents devote time to raising their new family member, and soon
develop an emotional bond with the child.' In most instances,
the placement of the child marks the beginning of a close parent-
child relationship. A California court recently has held that the
prospective parents' interest in continuing this relationship is de-
serving of judicial protection.4
This comment focuses on two cases, Rodriguez v. Superior
Court' and C.V.C. v. Superior Court,6 which held that an adop-
tion agency's administrative action, terminating the placement of
a child, is subject to judicial review.7  Consideration is given to
the effect of these decisions on California adoption practices. In
addition, an analysis is made of the inadequacy of current Cali-
fornia law concerning adoption placement.
PLACEMENT PROCEDURES OF THE ADOPTION AGENCY
California's procedure for the adoption of children is gov-
erned entirely by statute.8 Thus, in order to determine what
1. See C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 909, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123
(1973); Rodriguez v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. App. 3d 510, 95 Cal. Rptr. 923
(1971).
2. After a child is relinquished to an adoption agency, the agency locates
a suitable home for the child and places him or her with prospective adoptive par-
ents. The placement of the child is only the initial step in the adoption procefure.
The adoption of the child is not finalized until the prospective parents file a peti-
tion for adoption and this petition is granted by the court. The adoption often
does not become final until over a year after the child is placed in the home.
3. See, e.g., C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 909, 916, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 123, 128 (1973).
4. C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 909, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123
(1973).
5. 18 Cal. App. 3d 510, 95 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1971).
6. 29 Cal. App. 3d 909, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1973).
7. C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 909, 915, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123,
127 (1973); Rodriguez v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. App. 3d 510, 513, 95 Cal. Rptr.
923, 924 (1971).
8. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 221-230.5 (West Supp. 1974). See Adoption of Mc-
Donald, 43 Cal. 2d 447, 452, 274 P.2d 860, 862 (1954).
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powers and duties the adoption agencies of California have, it is
necessary to look to the applicable statutory authority.
The adoption placement function is vested exclusively in li-
censed adoption agenciesY The California Civil Code makes it
a misdemeanor for anyone other than the natural parent or a li-
censed agency to place a child for adoption. 10 The California
Health and Safety Code provides that no person or agency shall
place a child in any home for adoption without first obtaining a
license from the State Department of Health." Thus, both public
and private adoption agencies must be licensed by the State before
they can place children for adoption.
The statutes establishing the procedure for adoption are
found in the Civil Code.'2 In addition, the Health and Safety
Code directs the State Department of Health to make rules and
regulations concerning the placement of children for adoption.'1
Thus, the powers and duties of the adoption agencies with re-
spect to the placement of children for adoption are found not only
in the Health and Safety Code and the Civil Code but also in the
rules and regulations as promulgated by the Department of
Health. 14
Section 224n of the Civil Code specifies the powers and du-
ties of adoption agencies during placement.' 5 This Code section
gives the adoption agency total responsibility for the care of a
child from the -time he or she has been relinquished to the agency
for adoption until the time a petition for the child's adoption has
been granted.' 6 Under section 224n, the 'agency is responsible
for the child even after he or she has been placed with prospective
parents. The agency's control over the child continues until ,the
parents' petition to adopt the child is granted by a superior court.' 7
9. CAL. CIV. CODE § 224q (West Supp. 1974). It should be noted, however,
that the statutes do make an exception for the natural parents who are authorized
to place their child independently.
10. Id.
11. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1508 (West Supp. 1974).
12. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 221-230.5 (West Supp. 1974).
13. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1530 (West Supp. 1974).
14. These regulations are found in CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 22, §§ 30501-855
(1972).
15. CAL. CIv. CODE § 224n (West Supp. 1974) provides in part:
The agency to which a child has been relinquished for adoption
shall be responsible for the care of the child, and shall be entitled to
the custody and control of the child at all times until a petition for adop-
tion has been granted. Any placement for temporary care, or for adop-
tion made by the agency, may be terminated at the discretion of the
agency at any time prior to the granting of a petition for adoption. In
the event 'of termination of any placement for temporary care or for
adoption, the child shall be returned promptly to the physical custody
of the agency.
16. Id.
17. The regulations of the Department of Health require an interim period,
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More importantly, this section gives the adoption agency the
power to terminate a placement for temporary care or adoption
at any time prior to the granting of an adoption petition, if, in
the judgment of the agency, the home becomes unsuitable."i
How The The Agency Uses Its Power
The procedure which an adoption agency is to follow when
placing children in suitable homes is set out generally in the Cali-
fornia Administrative Code' 9 and in the State Department's Man-
ual of Adoption Policies and Procedures.20  Before a child can
be placed, the adoption agency must determine which home
among its applicants is most suitable for that child.21  To aid in
the determination of whether a couple would make suitable par-
ents for a child, the State has provided the agencies with certain
guiding criteria.22 This guide, however, is not a mandatory
checklist and the criteria are not necessarily determinative. 2'
Adoption agencies in most states are given a large degree
of freedom in making their selection of parents. The fact that
a couple meets the statutory requirements 24 does not assure that
they will be accepted as adoptive parents.25 In determining
whether a home is suitable, adoption agencies give consideration
to a wide variety of social factors.20  These factors include the
age of the prospective parents, their health, religion, race, finan-
cial security and standard of living.27 Of these criteria, race and
religion traditionally have been deemed to be most important.28
The California Administrative Code states that the child shall
be placed with adoptive parents whose religious faith is the same
normally one year, between the placement of the child by an adoption agency and
the granting of the final adoption decree by a superior court. CAL. ADM. CODE
tit. 22, § 30647 (1972). CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 226-27 (West Supp. 1974) explain
the procedure for obtaining an adoption decree.
18. CAL. Civ. CODE § 224n (West Supp. 1974).
19. CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 22, §§ 30639-649 (1972).
20. California State Dept. of Social Welfare, Manual of Policies and Proced-
dures, Adoption, §§ AD-251 through AD-257.1, Jan. 5, 1965 [hereinafter cited as
Manual].
21. CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 22, § 30643 (1972) provides in part: "In choosing
adoptive parents for a child the agency shall select from its approved applicants
the family which is best able to meet [the child's] needs."
22. Manual, supra note 20, Appendix No. 29.
23. Id. The Manual notes that "[t]hese criteria are not . . . intended to be
more than a rough outline of factors believed to be important."
24. For example, CAL. CIv. CODE § 222(a) (West Supp. 1974) merely re-
quires that "the person adopting a child shall be at least 10 years older than the
person adopted."
25. S. Kxrz, WHEN PARENrs FAML, 123 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KArZ].
26. Id.
27. TenBroek, California Adoption Law and Programs, 6 HAsT. L.J. 261, 312
(19.55).
28. KATz, supra note 25, at 123.
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as that of the child, or his or her parents, unless they have ex-
pressed a contrary desire. 29  This requirement is often a difficult
one to meet. 0 It has been suggested that religious considerations
should not be based on the desires of the natural parents and
should be relevant only when such considerations further the
child's best interests.3 '
Many adoption agencies throughout the United States also
believe that racial backgrounds should be considered in the deter-
mination of adoptive suitability.32 However, like the criterion of
religion, the racial factor has come under increased criticism.
There has been a recent trend in some adoption agencies in large
metropolitan areas to encourage interracial adoptions.3
Many agencies consider certain factors to be -total bars to
adoptive parenthood. These factors include disabilities of a pro-
spective parent which seriously affect life expectancy or physical
activity, mental illness of a parent, and a standard of living too
low for the safety, health and normal development of the child.34
In California, once an adoption agency has determined that
certain applicants will make suitable adoptive parents, it places the
child in their home. Although section 224n of the Civil Code is
the guiding statute regarding placement, it really does no more than
set out the general rights and obligations of the adoption agency
vis-a-vis the child.35  The procedure which the agency is to follow
when placing a child is prescribed more specifically in the Admin-
istrative Code" and the Manual of Adoption Policies and Proce-
dures.3" Two principal steps are involved in the placement pro-
cedure. First, the regulations require that the agency and the
prospective parents enter into an agreement covering the rights
and responsibilities of each during the period from the initial
placement of the child to the granting of the final adoption de-
cree. 38  Second, the regulations direct that there be an interim
29. CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 22, § 30643 (1972).
30. J. ROWE, PARENTS, CHILDREN AND ADOPTION 170-72 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as RowE].
31. KATZ, supra note 25, at 129.
32. Id. at 131.
33. Id.
34. ROWE, supra note 30, at 169.
35. CAL. CIV. CODE § 224n (West Supp. 1974).
36. CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 22, §§ 30639-649 (1972).
37. Manual, supra note 20.
38. CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 22, § 30645 (1972). The Manual, supra note 20,
§ AD-256 states that the placement agreement should include these provisions:
1. The family will assume responsibility for the nurture and care of the
child and keep the agency informed of any changes which may occur
within the family.
2. The family will keep the child under the medical supervision required
by the agency. A final medical report for the child will be obtained
prior to the completion of the adoption. The agency will give nec-
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period (usually one year) between the placement of the child and
the final adoption.39  During this time the agency is to provide
various services to the family.4" When a child is placed in a
home, the prospective parents frequently enter into a contract with
the adoption agency, in which -they agree not to file a petition for
adoption until the child has spent one year with the family."
The purpose of the supervisory period and post-placement
services is to effect a successful integration of the child into the
family.42 Despite this commendable purpose, in many instances
the effect of the interim period has been to foster confusion re-
garding the prospective adoptive parents' legal rights during this
time. Placement itself does not give the adoptive parents legal
custody of the child. Until a petition for adoption has been
granted, custody and control of the child remain in the adoption
agency, which retains the right to terminate the placement at its
discretion.4 3  Because the agency has this right, the prospective
parents are placed in an uncertain position. These parents, who
are responsible for the day-to-day upbringing of the child placed
with them, develop strong emotional ties with the child during this
interim period.14  Prior to the decisions of Rodriguez v. Superior
Court45 and C.V.C. v. Superior Court,46 however, the parents had
no legal means of protecting this emotional interest. But in -these
two California cases, the courts recognized the need for adoptive
parents to be able to protect the parent-child relationship initiated
essary consents for hospitalization, surgery, or other treatment.
3. The family and agency agree regarding the fee.
4. The family will not remove the child from the state, either perma-
nently or temporarily, without the agency's consent.
5. The agency will give immediate consideration to any request by the
family to terminate placement.
6. The family will agree to return the child promptly to the physical
custody of the agency if the placement is terminated.
39. CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 22, § 30647 (West 1972).
40. Id. The Manual, supra note 20, § AD-257.1 notes that
[s]ome of the areas in which the agency may provide help and
services are:
1. Questions or concern which the family may have re-
lated to the fact that the child was born to other parents.
2. Help in telling the child about his natural family.
3. Family or individual reactions to behavior or responses
of child.
4. Anxieties or uncertainties centering around informing the
child and others of his adoption.
5. Assistance in completing the adoption.
6. Identification of child with family group and community.
41. See, e.g., C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 909, 913, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 123, 126 (1973).
42. Manual, supra note 20, § AD-257.1.
43. CAL. CIV. CODE § 224n (West Supp. 1974).
44. See, e.g., C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 909, 916, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 123, 128 (1973).
45. 18 Cal. App. 3d 510, 95 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1971).
46. 29 Cal. App. 3d 909, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1973).
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by the placement of a child for eventual adoption. It was noted in
both cases that the statute allowing an agency to terminate place-
ment at its discretion omitted any safeguard against arbitrary
agency action."
To protect against such arbitrary action, the court in Rod-
riguez held that the prospective parents have the right to petition
for a writ of mandate under section 1085 of the California Code
of Civil Procedure48 for review of an agency order terminating
placement. 9 Two years later, the court in C.V.C. expanded the
prospective parents' right to judicial review of a placement ter-
mination, holding that the parents had a status entitling them to
procedural due process.50 Thus, the courts in these two cases re-
duced the power delegated the adoption agencies under Civil Code
section 224n by holding that any decision by an agency to terminate
placement during the interim period is subject to judicial review.5'
As a result of these decisions there may be significant changes
in both ,the pre-placement and post-placement procedures of
adoption agencies.
LIMITING THE POWERS OF THE ADOPTION AGENCY
Rodriguez v. Superior Court5 2
Rodriguez was the first California case to hold that the ad-
ministrative action of an agency in a pre-adoption placement
should be subject to judicial review.53 With this case the pre-
adoption rights of the prospective parents began to receive judicial
recognition.
On July 31, 1969, the Adoption Agency of ,the Stanislaus
County Welfare Department placed a child with Mr. and Mrs.
Rodriguez for adoption. On February 10, 1971, a caseworker for
the agency told the Rodriguez that the placement of the child
was being terminated and that the child was to be returned
-to the agency. A report by the caseworker, which was the basis
for 'the termination, gave no reasons for the action except her
doubts and uneasiness concerning the suitability of Mr. and Mrs.
Rodriguez as adoptive parents.54 On February 11, 1970, the
47. Id. at 916-17, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 128; See Rodriguez v. Superior Court,
18 Cal. App. 3d 510, 512-13, 95 Cal. Rptr. 923, 924.
48. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1085 (West 1955).
49. 18 Cal. App. 3d at 513, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
50. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 915, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
51. C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 909, 915, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123,
127 (1973); Rodriguez v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. App. 3d 510, 513, 95 Cal. Rptr.
923, 924 (1971).
52. 18 Cal. App. 3d 510, 95 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1971).
53. Id. at 513, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
54. The caseworker's declaration stated:
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Rodriguez, without the approval of the agency, filed a petition for
the adoption of the child in the superior court.
The court dismissed (the action, claiming that it had no juris-
diction to proceed because the petition for adoption was not filed
prior to the notice of termination of the placement.55  The Rodri-
guez appealed, and the court of appeal held that the trial court
had correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to proceed
with the adoption petition. However, the appellate court then di-
rected the trial court to permit the Rodriguez to amend their peti-
tion to state an action in mandate under section 1085 of 'the Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure 56 for review of the adoption agen-
cy's order terminating placement.5 7  Noting the importance of an
adoption to the prospective parents and to the welfare of the child,
the court stated:
Although no provision for such review is found in section
224n and relevant sections of the Civil Code, we hold that an
order by an adoption agency to terminate an adoptive par-
ent-child status is a reviewable administrative order within
the ambit of section 1084 and 1085 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure.5 8
Rodriguez, therefore, limited the powers granted to the
adoption agencies under section 224n of the Civil Code, and nar-
rowed the discretionary power of the adoption agencies by giving
the prospective parents the right to petition for judicial review of a
placement termination. The scope of the review authorized in
Rodriguez was, however, of a limited nature. Sections 1084 and
1085 of the Code of Civil Procedure59 provide for the remedy of
"traditional mandamus" to correct the actions of agencies.6" This
In July, 1970, I began to have doubts as to the suitability of Mr.
and Mrs. Rodriguez as adoptive parents. Mr. and Mrs. Rodriguez were
unable to relieve the cause of my concern and I became increasingly un-
easy about the placement. Finally, I determined that it would be impos-
sible for me to recommend that Mr. and Mrs. Rodriguez adopt the child
and that the child should be returned for another placement.
Id. at 512-13, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
55. Id. at 512, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 924. The superior court based its decision
regarding jurisdiction on the provisions of section 224n of the Civil Code. See
note 15 supra.
56. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1085 (West 1955) states:
It [the writ of mandate] may be issued by any court, except a mu-
nicipal or justice court, to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or
person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially en-
joins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or to compel
the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which he is entitled, and from which he is unlawfully precluded by
such inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person.
57. 18 Cal. App. 3d at 513, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
58. Id. at 513, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
59. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §§ 1084-85 (West 1955).
60. C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 909, 918, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123,
130 (1973).
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type of review is narrow in scope, and the court's inquiry is con-
fined to whether the administrative agency has abused its discre-
tion.6' Thus, although Rodriguez provided the prospective par-
ents with a new protection -against arbitrary agency action, that
protection was not sufficiently broad.
C.V.C. v. Superior Court6 2
C.V.C. v. Superior Court expanded the right to judicial re-
view which had been granted adoptive parents in Rodriguez.
The court in C.V.C. found that the fourteenth amendment's guar-
antee of due process required a much broader judicial review of
placement terminations than that available under sections 1084
and 1085 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 63
In November, 1971, the Sacramento County Department of
Social Welfare, a licensed adoption agency, placed an 18 month-
old girl with Mr. and Mrs. C. The prospective parents made an
agreement with the adoption agency that no adoption petition
would be filed until the child had spent a year with the family. 64
In July, 1972, an anonymous ,telephone call led to the discovery
by the agency that Mr. C. had "engaged in drinking" and was
attending therapy sessions. Prior to receiving this information,
the caseworker had asked Mr. C. if he had a drinking problem
and he had replied in the negative. There was no evidence that
Mr. C. was habitually intoxicated or intoxicated in the presence
of his adoptive child or his three other children. After obtaining
this information regarding Mr. C.'s alleged drinking problem, the
agency determined that the adoption arrangement should be can-
celed.65 At the trial, the caseworker testified that since the peti-
tioners had withheld information from her, she no longer trusted
them and, for that reason, recommended that the placement be
terminated.66
Following its decision to terminate the placement, the agency
demanded the child's return and filed a habeas corpus petition
to enforce the demand. Mr. and Mrs. C. filed a mandate petition
seeking review of the agency's decision. The two actions were
consolidated and the superior court, stating that "its function was
limited to determining whether the agency had abused its discre-
61. Id. at 918-19, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
62. 29 Cal. App. 3d 909, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1973).
63. Id. at 919, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
64. Id. at 913, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
65. The adoption statutes do not provide for a hearing at the agency level.
The termination decision in this case was an ex parte one, reached at a conference
attended only by the caseworker, her adoption supervisor and their psychiatric
consultant. Id. at 917, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
66. Id. at 914, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 116.
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tion," 7 found no such abuse68 and directed Mr. and Mrs. C. to
return the child. 69 The petitioners filed a notice of appeal.
The court of appeal found that the superior court proceed-
ings had provided judicial review of the adoption agency's action.
The court qualified its finding, however, by stating that the peti-
tioners had a status entitling them to procedural due process, and
the lack of a hearing on the merits at the agency level and the
narrowness of the review at the judicial level had not comported
with constitutional requirements.7" The fourteenth amendment
guarantee of due process requires notice and an opportunity to
be heard before an individual suffers governmental deprivation of
a fundamental interest. The court of appeal found that the peti-
tioners had not been given sufficient notice and had not been al-
lowed the requisite opportunity to be heard prior to the agency's
decision to terminate the placement. 7
In making its determination that petitioners had an interest
entitling them to the protections of procedural due process, the
C.V.C. court noted that,
[e]ntitlement to procedural protections depends upon the ex-
tent to which "grievous loss" is threatened; it requires the
court to weigh the individual's interest in avoiding the loss
against the governmental interest in summary adjudication.7 2
The court determined that the prospective parents had an in-
terest in continuing the relationship with the child who had been
placed with them. It was noted by the court that the placement
of the child with the parents "initiates the 'closest conceivable
counterpart of the relationship of parent and child.' "I' Further,
the court found that the termination of this relationship obviously
would result in a "grievous loss" to the parents. 4
In ascertaining the exact nature of the government's interest,
the court looked to section 224n of the Civil Code. 75 The court
recognized that this section clearly expresses the state's interest
in terminating a placement whenever the child's welfare is endan-
gered.76  It was noted by the court, however, that by giving the
67. Id.
68. Id. at 912, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
69. The child was taken from the C.'s on October 13, 1972. On that same
day the adoption agency placed the child with new prospective parents. Id. at
913 n.1, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 125 n.l.
70. id. at 915, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
71. Id.
72. Id. [footnotes omitted].
73. Id at 916, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
74. Id.
75. CAL. CirV. CODE § 224n (West Supp. 1974).
76. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 916, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
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adoption agency complete discretion as to when a placement will
be terminated, the prospective parents are left with inadequate
protection against arbitrary action. 77
The court weighed the parents' interest in continuing the par-
ent-child relationship against the government's interest in sum-
mary adjudication and found that "in the absence of imminent
danger to the child, the grievous loss threatening the prospective
parents outweighs the state's interest in summary termination
[of the placement] .' 78 Because the parents' interest outweighed
the state's, the C.V.C. court held that the parents were entitled
to the protections of procedural due process. 79
The scope of judicial review necessary to meet due process
demands was outlined by -the C.V.C. court. The court found judi-
cial review of an agency action terminating placement to be gov-
erned by section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure." That
section sets forth two standards of judicial review. It provides that
in some cases, the court is authorized ,to review independently the
evidence and determine whether the agency findings are sup-
ported by the "weight of the evidence."'" In all other cases, the
section requires that the court determine only whether the admin-
istrative decision is supported by "substantial evidence."8 2  In
C.V.C. the court found that the superior court should have made
an independent review of the evidence regarding -the placement
termination, since "a constitutionally protected interest [was] at
stake. ' 's3
The C.V.C. court noted that a superior court, in making such
a de novo judicial review, must determine whether the agency's
decision to abrogate placement is justified by the best interest of
the child.84  The court commented that -the objective of the in-
77. Id. at 917, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 917, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 128-29.
80. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1094.5 (West 1955). This statute governs judi-
cial review after an administrative order "made as the result of a proceeding in
which by law a hearing is required to be given." Id. § 1094.5(a).
81. Id. § 1094.5(c). In Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143-44, 481 P.2d
242, 251-52, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 243-44 (1971), the California Supreme Court ex-
plained that if the decision of an administrative agency substantially affects a fun-
damental vested right, the trial court not only must examine the administrative
record for errors but must exercise its independent judgment on the evidence dis-
closed in a limited trial de novo, whereas if no fundamental vested right is in-
volved the trial court need not look beyond the administrative record.
82. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1094.5(c) (West 1955).
83. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 918-19, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 130. For a detailed analy-
sis of the scope of review required under the C.V.C. decision, see Note, C.V.C.
v. Superior Court: Court Versus Adoption Agency Control of Agency Adoptions
Before A Petition for Adoption is Filed, 26 HAST. L.J. 312, 329-33 (1,974) [here-
inafter cited as Court Versus Adoption Agency].
84. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 920, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 130-31.
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dependent review is not to "supplant the adoption agency," but
to "prevent arbitrary judgments" and "insure that the ultimate de-
cision is firmly hinged on the only permissible criterion-the wel-
fare of the child.""5 In making its independent review, a superior
court is to receive and consider any competent evidence produced
by either side and from that evidence determine wha is best
for the child.86 Apparently there are no presumptions in favor
of the agency's decision to terminate. The C.V.C. court merely
noted that the decisions and expert opinions of agency social
workers should be "received with respect. 87  Thus, a court has
wide discretion in determining whether an agency's decision to
terminate a placement should be upheld.
By giving the judiciary the final authority to determine
whether the placement of a child should be terminated, the
C.V.C. court has limited the power of adoption agencies. Changes
in the policies and practices of these agencies no doubt will follow
from such curtailment of their power.
THE EFFECTS OF RODRIGUEZ AND C.V.C. v.
SUPERIOR COURT
Agency Adoptions
California adoption agencies place thousands of children with
prospective parents each year.8 8 Many of these placement ar-
85. Id. at 919, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
86. Id. at 920, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
87. Id. at 919, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
88. The following tables show the number of children placed for adoption in
California from 1949 through 1972.
TABLE E-31
ADOPTIONS: CHILDREN PLACED FOR ADOPTION
IN CALIFORNIA, 1949-69
Adoption agencies
Year ending Inde-
June 30 Total Private Public pendent
1949 -.. ---------.-.-.-. . . - . .596 557 39 3,759
1950 660 521 139 3,312
1951 872 414 458 3,253
1952 --- .....-.-.- .....---------------------- 1,065 468 597 3,593
1953 -.... ---------... - -----......... 1,338 534 804 3,938
1954 ---.-.----------- ........ --------------- 1,746 694 1,052 4,032
1955 1,969 897 1,072 4,137
1956 ------------------------------- 2,157 914 1,243 4,101
1957 2,418 1,147 1,271 4,214
1958 2,470 1,144 1,326 4,265
1959 --------------------- 2,652 1,216 1,436 4,552
1960 --- -------. 3,266 1,508 1,758 4,994
1961 3,641 1,506 2,135 4,872
1962 4,328 1,659 2,669 4,827
1963 --------------- 4,738 1,531 3,207 4,890
1964 ----- 5,571 1,739 3,832 4,912
1965 6,340 1,729 4,611 4,772
1966 . 7,010 1,951 5,059 4,683
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rangements are terminated prior to the granting of an adoption
petition.8" These placemen terminations may be initiated by
1967 7,610 2,200 5,410 4,370
1968 8,392 2,337 6,055 3,995
1969 -----------...........-------- - -8,667 2,366 6,301 3,390
Department of Social Welfare
Research and Statistics
(STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT (1970))
TABLE E-33
ADOPTIONS: CHILDREN PLACED FOR ADOPTION
IN CALIFORNIA, 1970(Note: Data in this table update the series shown in Table E-31
in the 1970 California Statistical Abstract.)
Number
Adoption agencies
Total ------------------ 7,755
Private -....-.-.------------------.-.-.-.------------..........------------------ - - 2,037
P u b lic -----....--- -. - .....  ---------. .  . . .... .... . ... .... .... .... 5 ,7 18
Independent ---------------------.-.---- ...-.--- - .-- ....................-------------------- 3,115
Department of Social Welfare
Management Information Systems
(STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT (1971))
TABLE E-21
ADOPTIONS: CHILDREN PLACED FOR ADOPTION
IN CALIFORNIA, 1971(Note: Data in this table update the series shown in Table E-33
in the 1971 California Statistical Abstract.)
Number
Adoption agencies
Total ---------------------------- - ---- ---- -- - -- - .- --..................--- 5,559
'Private -- '1,438
Public --------------------.---.-------.-------------.-.--- .............-- -- -- -- - -- - 4,121
Independent ------------------------------------------- ..........- - - ------- - - - -- - - 2,603
Department of Social Welfare
Management Systems Development
(STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT (1972))
TABLE E-27
ADOPTIONS: CHILDREN PLACED FOR ADOPTION
IN CALIFORNIA, 1972
(Note: Data in this table update the series shown in Table E-21
in the 1972 California Statistical Abstract.)
Number
Adoption agencies
Total ----------------------------------------------- ......-- - - ---- - - ----  -  3,934
Private ------.-.-....-.-.-.-.--- ....- - ---- .- ...-- ..- - --.-.------------------- 922
Public ------------------------------------------------------------- -  - -- - --  -  3,012
Independent --------------- ...--.-...................---------------------------------------- 2,348
Department of Social Welfare
Program Support Branch
(STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT (1973))
89. The following figures indicate the percentage of total placements by the
Santa Clara County Social Services Department which were terminated before the
granting of an adoption petition:
Percent of Placements
Year Terminated
1971 4.1%
1972 8.8%
1973 16.4%
The increase in terminations is due to the fact that a greater number of older
children are being placed. Telephone interview with Mr. Shaufler, Placement Co-
ordinator, Santa Clara County Social Services Department, Feb. 26, 1974.
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either the adoption agencies or the prospective parents.90 Since
the holdings of Rodriguez and C.V.C. place substantial restrictions
on the ability of an adoption agency to terminate placements, it
is likely that these cases will have a significant impact on the place-
ment procedures of California adoption agencies.
It is probable that Rodriguez and C.V.C. will affect agency
practices in two ways. First, the agencies may find it necessary
to conduct a more extensive pre-placement investigation of the
suitability of prospective parents.91 Such a practice, of course,
would benefit the agency, the prospective parents and the child.
A more thorough pre-placement investigation would mean fewer
placement terminations, and a reduction in the number of place-
ment terminations would result in fewer changes in custody of the
child. Second, the over-all result of the C.V.C. requirement of
judicial review of post-placement terminations may be an in-
creased reluctance on the part of adoption agencies to remove a
child once he or she has been placed in a home. Agencies prob-
ably will refrain from terminating placements unless there is
clear evidence that a termination is necessary to further the best
interests of the child. An adoption agency now may be more hes-
itant to terminate a placement if the only existing grounds for ter-
mination are a caseworker's "doubts" or "uneasiness" concerning
the prospective parents' suitability.92 Hopefully, an increased re-
luctance on the part of the agencies to remove a child from his
or her prospective home will result in fewer seemingly arbitrary
terminations.
Independent Adoptions
In both Rodriguez and C.V.C, the adoptive child was placed
with prospective parents by an adoption agency. It should be
noted, however, that a child may be placed for adoption by either
a licensed adoption agency or his or her natural parents.9 An
90. A significant number of the terminations are initiated by prospective par-
ents who find they are unable to cope with the child who has been placed with
them. Interview with Mrs. Ruth Canada, District Director, Central Coast Coun-
ties District, Children's Home Society, Jan. 24, 1974.
91. In C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 909, 918 n.12, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 123, 129 n.12 (1973), the court commented that "[c]onceivably, the consti-
tutional necessity for independent judicial review of post-placement terminations
will encourage comprehensive pre-placement investigations."
92. In Rodriguez v. Superior Court, the only reasons given for the termination
of the placement were the caseworker's doubts and uneasiness concerning the suit-
ability of the Rodriguez. 18 Cal. App. 3d at 512, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 925 (1971).
93. CAL. CIV. CODE § 224q (West Supp. 1974). See generally Comment,
Adoption Agencies in California: Lack of Adequate Control?, 5 U.C.D.L. REv.
512 (1972).
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independent or private adoption is a proceeding in which a child
is placed directly with adopting parents by the natural parents
without the assistance of an agency.94 The parent who makes an
"independent adoption" placement must sign a "consent" to adop-
tion in the presence of an agent of the State Department
of Health.9" When a child is placed directly with adoptive par-
ents, these parents usually file a petition for adoption immedi-
ately.96 Thus, unlike agency adoptions, there is normally no wait-
ing period between the time of placement and the time of filing
a petition for adoption. The State Department of Health is re-
quired to make a study of the prospective parents' home to deter-
mine whether it is suitable for the child.97 This investigation must
be completed within 180 days of the filing of the petition to adopt.
Parents who independently place their child may withdraw
their consent to the adoption and request a return of the child
any time before the court grants the final adoption decree.9"
However, once the natural parent or parents have signed the con-
sent to adopt they may not demand the return of their child with-
out obtaining court approval.99 If the court determines that the
withdrawal of consent and return of the child to his or her natural
parents is reasonable and in the best interests of the child, the
court will grant its approval. 100
Prospective parents who obtain a child through an independ-
ent adoption placement do not encounter the lengthy placement
period or lack of judicial review of a placement termination which
were experienced by the petitioners in Rodriguez and C.V.C.
The interim period between an independent placement and the
final granting of the adoption decree usually is very short. In ad-
dition, if the natural parents desire to terminate the independent
placement, the prospective parents are assured of a judicial review
of that proposed termination. Thus, the decisions of Rodriguez
and C.V.C would appear to be inapplicable to independent adop-
tions and should have no effect on this type of adoption proce-
dure.
The Parents
Adoptive parents. The prospective parents' right to con-
tinue in the parent-child relationship which begins when a child
94. P. ADAMS, ADOPTION PRACTICE IN CALIFORNIA 1 (1956).
95. CAL. CIV. CODE § 226.1 (West Supp. 1974).
96. California State Dept. of Social Welfare, Adoptions in California 9-10,
June, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Adoptions in California].
97. CAL. CIV. CODE § 226.4 (West Supp. 1974).
98. Adoptions in California, supra note 96, at 6.
99. CAL. CIV. CODE § 226a (West Supp. 1974).
100. Id.
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is placed in their home clearly deserves judicial protection. The
effect of Rodriguez and C.V.C. on the adoptive parent-child rela-
tionship no doubt will be beneficial. The parents will no longer
be placed in the uncertain position of having total responsibility
for the day-to-day care of the child while enjoying in him or her
no legally recognized rights. More importantly, there will be less
,tension between the agency and the adoptive parents during the
one-year supervisory period. Prior to Rodriguez and C.V.C., it
is likely that many prospective parents saw the adoption agency
as a threat. Since the agency could demand the return of the
child at any time prior to the granting of the adoption petition,
the parents no doubt felt they must constantly be on the defensive.
Since judicial review of agency action is now available to prospec-
tive parents during the supervisory period, it is probable that the
relations between the parents and the agency will be less strained.
Improved relations between the parents and the agency will make
the integration of the child into -the family an easier process.
Foster parents. A strong argument can be made for extend-
ing the holdings of Rodriguez and C.V.C. -to foster parents. As
with adoptive parents, the placement of a child with foster parents
is guided by seotion 224n of the Civil Code.'' Usually -these par-
ents are not interested in adopting the child placed with them but
are willing merely to -take responsibility for the child's care until
the adoption agency finds a suitable home for the child. In ad-
dition the child placed with foster parents often is not adoptable.
For example, a child who has a severe medical problem usually
is deemed to be unsuitable for adoption, yet he or she may be
placed in a foster home for temporary care.' 0
2
Occasionally, however, foster parents will express a desire
to adopt the child who has been placed with them for foster
care.' 0 ' An adoption agency usually resists any attempt by the
foster parents to adopt' and often demands a return of the child
when it believes that the foster parents have become too emotion-
ally attached to the child.' The foster parent is obligated to re-
turn the child by the provisions of section 224n and often by the
101. CAL. Civ. CODE § 224n (West Supp. 1974) provides in part:
Any placement for temporary care . . . made by the agency, may be
terminated at the discretion of the agency at any time prior to the grant-
ing of a petition for adoption. In the event of termination of any place-
ment for temporary care . . . the child shall be returned promptly to
the physical custody of the agency.
102. See text accompanying notes 107-08, infra, discussing Adoption of Run-
yon, 268 Cal. App. 2d 918, 919, 74 Cal. Rptr. 514, 515 (1969).
103. Id. See also KATZ, supra note 25, at 96-100.
104. Adoption of Runyon, 268 Cal. App. 2d 918, 919, 74 Cal. Rptr. 514, 515
(1969).
105. KATz, supra note 25, at 96-100.
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provisions of a foster care contract. 106
In the case of Adoption of Runyon'07 James Runyon was
placed in the home of the Callahans three days after he was born.
The Sacramento County Social Welfare Department had placed
him in the home as a foster child and not for adoption. Three
weeks later the welfare department informed the Callahans ,that
the child had an enlarged heart with a hole in it, and that they
could return him if they so desired. The Callahans decided to
keep -the child and saw him through heart surgery. Eight years
after the child had been placed with the Callahans the welfare
department removed him and placed him in the home of prospec-
tive parents. The Callahans immediately filed a petition to adopt
the child. The superior court granted a motion to dismiss the ac-
tion on the ground that section 224n prevents a court from grant-
ing a petition for 'adoption to anyone other than the prospective
parents with whom the child has been placed for adoption by 'the
agency.' 8 In this case the child had been placed with the Calla-
hans merely for foster care, and that placement had been termina-
ted.
It is unlikely that Rodriguez or C.V.C. will in any way rem-
edy the foster parents' inability to petition for adoption, since sec-
tion 224n specifically prohibits such a petition. 10 9 It could be 'ar-
gued, however, that under the holdings of these two cases the fos-
ter parent should have a right to judicial review of any agency
action causing the removal of the foster child from the home.
Under section 224n, adoptive parents have only a provisional
and tentative status until a petition for adoption is granted by the
court.110 The prospective parents are made aware of -the fact 'that
'they must return the child promptly if 'the placement is termi-
nated. 1 ' Despite the tentative nature of this adoptive parent-
child status, it has been held that prospective parents have a right
106. Id. at 94-95. The foster care contract often contains a provision similar
to the following:
We acknowledge that we are accepting the child placed with us for
an indeterminate period, depending on the needs of the child and hisfamily situation. We are aware that the legal responsibility for the
foster child remains with the Agency, and we will accept and comply
with any plans the Agency makes for the child. This includes the right
to determine when and how the child leaves us, and we agree to cooper-
ate with the arrangements made toward that end.
Id. at 95.
107. 268 Cal. App. 2d 918, 74 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1969).
108. Id. at 919-20, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 515-16.
109. CAL. CIV. CODE § 224n (West Supp. 1974).
110. C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 909, 916, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123,
128 (1973).
111. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
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to judicial review of any agency termination of placement. 112
Foster parents also have only a tentative status under section
224n of the Civil Code. They too are made aware of the fact
that they will be required to return the child to the agency upon
demand.11  The question then is whether foster parents, like
adoptive parents, have a status which, although tentative, entitles
them to procedural due process prior to termination of the foster-
child placement.
The C.V.C. court found adoptive parents to have a status en-
titling them to procedural due process, because the adoptive par-
ents' interest in continuing the parent-child relationship outweighed
the state's interest in summary termination of placement. 14 Some
foster parents also could meet this test.
It might be argued that the emotional investment of foster
parents is not comparable to that of adoptive parents be-
cause the former usually are informed at the outset that the child
will not be available for their adoption." 5 But such an argument
does not recognize the realities of many foster parent-child rela-
tionships. In C.V.C. the court commented that an adoptive par-
ent's "emotional investment does not await the ultimate decree
of adoption." 1 6  Likewise, the emotional investment of a foster
parent is not dependent upon a right to adopt. It is inevitable
that a strong emotional bond will develop between a child and
his or her foster parents after they have lived together for a
period of time."'
The parents in Adoption of Runyon"" made a considerable
emotional investment in their foster child. It is obvious that, after
eight years of having the child in their home, his removal caused
a "grievous loss" to the parents. The Callahan's interest in avoid-
ing this "grievous loss" clearly outweighed the adoption agency's
interest in terminating the foster placement without prior notice
or a hearing.
When a foster parent-child relationship is identical to
that which existed in Runyon, the parents should have, under the
holding of C.V.C., the right to judicial review of an agency action
terminating the foster child placement. Such a review not only
112. C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 909, 915, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123,
127 (1973).
113. See note 106 and accompanying text supra.
114. C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 909, 917, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123,
128 (1973).
115. See note 106 and accompanying text supra.
116. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 916, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
117. Katz, Legal Aspects of Foster Care, 5 FAM. L.Q. 283, 300 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as Foster Care].
118. 268 Cal. App. 2d 918, 74 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1969).
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would protect the interest of the parents but also would help to
insure that the placement termination is in the best interest of the
foster child. It should be noted, however, that the facts of Run-
yon are unusual, 'and most foster parent-child relationships are not
identical to the relationship which existed between the Callahans
and their foster child. Thus, the determination of whether a
foster parent is entitled to a judicial review of a placement
termination by an adoption agency should depend on the facts of
each case. In any event, however, when a child has lived in a
foster home for a number of years and a close relationship has
developed between the foster parents and the child, the parents
should be entitled to a judicial review of any agency action which
terminates the placement of the child.
The Child
The C.V.C. decision will result in an increase in litigation
during the placement stage of adoption proceedings. It is con-
ceivable that additional litigation will force some adoptive children
to undergo multiple custody changes. The resulting instability
would hinder the healthy development of the child.119 In C.V.C.
,the adoptive child was first placed with Mr. and Mrs. C., then re-
turned to the county adoption agency by order of the superior
court, then placed with a new adoptive couple, and finally re-
turned to the county agency by order of the court of appeal. 2 '
The court in C.V.C. discussed this problem and noted that it is
common practice for the courts to preserve the status quo and
avoid multiple changes of custody where possible. 2 ' The court
implied that the proper procedure would be for ,the child to
remain in the home of the adoptive parents with whom he or
she had been placed until the judicial review of an agency decision
to terminate placement is completed.' 22 If the courts did allow
the adoptive parents to care for the child until the final deter-
mination of -their rights, the problem of multiple custody would
be lessened.
Such a resolution of the multiple custody issue raises a second
problem. There may be instances where preserving the place-
ment would pose a threat to the child's well-being. If, for exam-
ple, an adoption agency decides to terminate a placement because
it has received evidence that the adoptive parent has been
abusing the child, must the agency wait to remove the child until
119. Foster Care, supra note 117, at 296. See also Court Versus Adoption
Agency, supra note 83, at 324-26.
120. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 921, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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there has been an independent judicial review of its action?
The court in C.V.C. v. Superior Court answered this question in
the negative, saying that courts should preserve the placement
only "when it poses no threat to the child."' 23  Thus, where pre-
serving -the status quo would endanger a child's well-being, the
agency would be justified in demanding -the immediate return of
the child and filing a habeas corpus petition to enforce that de-
mand. The Court of Appeal noted that,
[a]n imminent danger to the child's health or safety would
create an exceptional situation, elevating the public interest
in summary termination above -the interests of the prospec-
tive parents, justifying removal first and hearing later.124
The court indicated, however, that if a situation arose in which
the agency was justified in removing the child before a hearing,
that agency should not place the child in a new home before the
hearing on the removal has taken place, since the court may order
the child returned to the original prospective parents.
THE INADEQUACY OF CURRENT CALIFORNIA ADOPTION
LAW: THE NEED FOR AN INTERLOCUTORY DECREE
In Rodriguez and C.V.C., the California courts discussed the
prospective parents' right to continue in the parent-child relation-
ship initiated by a placement, and the necessity for judicial protec-
tion of that right. They failed to note, however, the adoptive
child's converse interests. The child who has been placed in a
new home has an interest, similar to that of the adoptive parents,
in a stable, continuous parent-child relationship. Numerous place-
ment terminations and multiple custody changes often
hinder the development of the child and are usually not in his
or her best interest.' 25 The courts should not hesitate to find that
the interest of the adoptive child in a stable placement, like that
of the parents, is deserving of judicial protection. The child
should be no more subject to arbitrary placement terminations
,than the parents.
Several states protect the prospective parents' and the adop-
tive child's right to a stable placement by requiring an interlocu-
tory adoption decree.' 26 In these states, a hearing is held when
a child is first placed with adoptive parents and, if the court ap-
123. Id. at 920, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
124. Id. at 917, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
125. Foster Care, supra note 117, at 296. See also Court Versus Adoption
Agency, supra note 83, at 324-26.
126. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-1-9 (1963); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-
226 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.32.210 (1961). See also M. LEAVY,
THE LAW OF ADOPTION 57 (1954) [hereinafter cited as LEAVY].
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proves the adoption, it will issue a temporary interlocutory
order.'27 Usually after six months or a year, the court will con-
sider the application again for a final adoption decree. 2 ' During
the interlocutory period, the child lives in the home of the pro-
spective parents and the placement is supervised by a licensed
adoption agency. 129
Statutes establishing this interlocutory procedure generally
provide that the decree may be revoked by the court at any time
during the supervisory period.' 0 Revocation usually may be
effected on the court's own motion or on the application of the
parents or the adoption agency. 13  When such an application is
made, the court holds a hearing to determine whether to set aside
the temporary decree.'l 2 In making this determination, the court
considers whether a revocation of the decree is in the best interest
of the child. If the interlocutory decree is not revoked during the
supervisory period, the court will issue at the end of the period a
final order approving the adoption.' 3  In those states where an
interlocutory adoption decree is required, the court maintains con-
trol over the placement procedure from the time the child initially
is placed with his or her new parents until the final adoption order
is granted. In contrast, under California's statutes governing
placement, only the adoption agency which places the child in a
new home retains complete control of the child until the final de-
cree is granted.' Under section 224n of the California Civil
Code, there is no requirement of judicial review if a placement
is terminated.' 3 '
The requirement of an interlocutory order and the subse-
quent court control provide greater protection of the rights of both
the child and parents than does the placement procedure of 'the
California Civil Code. Once a child has been placed with pro-
spective parents and an interlocutory decree has been granted, the
127. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-226 (1973). See also LEAVY, supra note
126, at 57.
128. LEAVY, supra note 126, at 57.
129. See, e.g., VA. CODE. ANN. § 63.1-228 (1973). See also LEAVY, supra
note 126, at 57.
130. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-227 (1973).
131. See LEAVY, supra note 126, at 57. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-227 provides
that:
It]he court may . . . revoke its interlocutory order . . . on its own mo-
tion, or on the motion of the natural parents of the child, or of the peti-
tioner, or of the child himself by his next friend, or of the child placing
agency ....
132. LEAVY, supra note 126, at 57-58.
133. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-230 (1973).
134. CAL. CIv. CODE § 224n (West Supp. 1974).
135. This lack of judicial review has, of course, been remedied to a certain
degree by the holdings of Rodriguez and C.V.C. See text accompanying note 137
infra.
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placement cannot be terminated by any party to the adoption with-
out judicial review. 136
The California statutes do not effectively protect the adoptive
parents' and child's interest in continuity of placement. Recogni-
zing this shortcoming, California courts in Rodriguez and C.V.C.
attempted to remedy the situation by requiring a judicial review
of any agency termination of placement. Although the protection
given the parents in C.V.C. is similar to that available under stat-
utes requiring interlocutory orders, it is not so extensive. Statutes
which require interlocutory adoption decrees usually provide that
a court hearing is necessary when any change is made in the
placement, whether it be by -the court, parents or agency."' In
addition, there is no requirement that the aggrieved party petition
the court for a hearing. In contrast, C.V.C. v. Superior Court re-
quires judicial review only when the agency has terminated the
placement and only if the parents petition the court. The result
is -that under C.V.C. v. Superior Court, the parents can always pro-
tect their rights by petitioning the court for review, but the child's
interest in continuity of placement is protected only if the termina-
,tion is initiated by the agency and the prospective parents file a
petition for review. If California were to adopt the requirement
of interlocutory adoption decrees, both the prospective parents and
the adoptive child would receive the protection of judicial review
whenever placement was modified in any way.
CONCLUSION
By extending the constitutional protection of due process to
adoptive parents, the court in C.V.C. v. Superior Court has taken
a step toward remedying the ambiguous status of prospective par-
ents. The adoptive couple will no longer be required to take re-
sponsibility for a child in whom they have no legally protected
rights.
In the future, California courts may have to determine how
broadly the decision in C.V.C. v. Superior Court is to be applied.
The courts may be asked to decide whether the protection of judi-
cial review is to be limited to adoptive parents or whether it should
be extended to foster parents. The status or right which entitled
the petitioners in C.V.C. to procedural due process is a status
or right which is also held by some foster parents. The relation-
ship which develops between a foster parent and child is often
as strong as, if not stronger than, the relationship between an
136. LEwy, supra note 126, at 57.
137. Id.
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adoptive parent and child. Thus, under certain circumstances,"'8
a foster parent should be entitled to the same due process pro-
tections as an adoptive parent.
The judicial review proposed by the court in C.V.C. v. Super-
ior Court is necessary not only to protect the rights of prospective
parents but also to further the best interests of the adoptive
child. Review by a neutral party of an agency's termination
of a placement is the most effective method of determining
whether that termination is, in fact, in the child's best interest.
However, further protection of the child's right and interest in
a stable placement is in order. Greater protection would be avail-
able if an interlocutory adoption decree were required in Cali-
fornia. The requirement of such a decree would insure judicial
protection of 'the child's rights during 'the placement period.
Suzanne Jones Boutin
138. See text accompanying note 118 supra.
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